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Abstract
Wireless standards (e.g., IEEE 802.11af and 802.22) have been developed for enabling opportunistic
access in TV white space (TVWS) using cognitive radio (CR) technology. When heterogeneous CR
networks that are based on different wireless standards operate in the same TVWS, coexistence issues
can potentially cause major problems. Enabling collaborative coexistence via direct coordination between
heterogeneous CR networks is very challenging, due to incompatible MAC/PHY designs of coexisting
networks, requirement of an over-the-air common control channel for inter-network communications,
and time synchronization across devices from different networks. Moreover, such a coexistence scheme
would require competing networks or service providers to exchange sensitive control information that
may raise conflict of interest issues and customer privacy concerns. In this paper, we present an
architecture for enabling collaborative coexistence of heterogeneous CR networks over TVWS, called
Symbiotic Heterogeneous coexistence ARchitecturE (SHARE). By mimicking the symbiotic relationships
between heterogeneous organisms in a stable ecosystem, SHARE establishes an indirect coordination
mechanism between heterogeneous CR networks via a mediator system, which avoids the drawbacks
of direct coordination. SHARE includes two spectrum sharing algorithms whose designs were inspired
by well-known models and theories from theoretical ecology, viz, the interspecific competition model
and the ideal free distribution model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The TV “white space” (TVWS) has the potential of providing significant bandwidth in fre-
quencies that have very favorable propagation characteristics (i.e., long transmission ranges and
A preliminary version of portions of this material has appeared in [4].
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superior capability of penetrating objects) [1]. In the U.S., United Kingdom, and other countries,
changes in the regulatory rules have been made or are being amended to open up the TVWS
for opportunistic operations of unlicensed (or secondary) users on a non-interference basis to
licensed users (a.k.a. incumbent or primary users) [7]. Industry and research stakeholders have
initialized standardization efforts to enable the utilization of TVWS by leveraging cognitive
radio (CR) technology. These efforts include IEEE 802.22 Wireless Regional Area Networks
(WRAN) [15], IEEE 802.11af (WiFi over TVWS) [14], ECMA 392 (WPAN over TVWS) [6],
etc. All of these standards rely on CR technology to overcome the challenging interference
issues between incumbent and secondary networks as well as between secondary networks. In
this paper, we simply use the term “CR network” to denote a CR-enabled wireless network
operating over TVWS.
The coexistence of secondary wireless networks in TVWS can be broadly classified into two
categories [2]: heterogeneous coexistence and homogeneous coexistence (a.k.a. self coexistence).
The former refers to the coexistence of networks that employ different wireless technologies (e.g.,
WiFi and Bluetooth) and the latter refers to the coexistence of networks that employ the same
wireless technology (e.g., neighboring 802.22 networks). There are two types of coexistence
schemes: non-collaborative and collaborative coexistence schemes.
• A non-collaborative coexistence scheme is the only feasible approach when there are no
means of coordination between the coexisting networks. In the existing literature, such
an approach has been used to address the heterogeneous coexistence of WiFi and Zig-
Bee networks [13], [31] as well as the homogeneous coexistence of uncoordinated WiFi
deployments [21] and femto cell deployments [26], [29].
• A collaborative coexistence scheme can be employed when coexisting networks can directly
coordinate their operations, and examples of such an approach include coexistence schemes
for cellular networks [10], [24] and 802.22 networks [5], [9], [17], [25]. The recently formed
IEEE 802.19.1 task group (TG) was chartered with the task of developing standardized
methods, which are radio access technology-independent, for enabling coexistence among
dissimilar or independently operated wireless networks [16]. This standard is currently being
developed, and it has yet to prescribe solid solutions.
As described below, existing coexistence schemes—both non-collaborative and collaborative—
cannot adequately address the problems posed by the coexistence of heterogeneous CR networks
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[3].
Non-collaborative coexistence schemes are simpler and cheaper to deploy, but not as effective
as collaborative schemes. Moreover, non-collaborative schemes cannot facilitate the coexistence
among networks with incompatible MAC strategies (e.g., coexistence between contention-based
and reservation-based MAC protocols) and cannot adequately address the hidden node problem.
Collaborative strategies are stricken with a number of very difficult technical and policy
problems. First, coexisting networks would need to exchange spectrum sharing control infor-
mation over a common control channel, and the realization of such a channel may require
a broad standardization effort across secondary systems that would be costly. Second, even
if an effective means of inter-network communications exists, implementation of collaborative
strategies would rely on time synchronization across devices from different networks. Achieving
synchronization over a potentially large number of coexisting TVWS networks may not be
feasible. Third, collaborative approaches would require the coexisting networks to exchange
potentially sensitive information—such as traffic load, bandwidth requirements, and network
characteristics—to negotiate partitioning of the spectrum. Exchanging such information between
competing wireless networks or service providers could potentially raise conflict-of-interest issues
and customer privacy concerns. Hence, it is difficult to find a global or centralized decision maker
to allocate spectrum for all competing networks.
In this paper, we propose a coexistence framework, called the Symbiotic Heterogeneous
coexistence ARchitectuRE (SHARE), for enabling collaborative coexistence among heterogeneous
CR networks. As its name implies, the proposed framework was inspired by the inter-species
relations that exist in biological ecosystems. A symbiotic relation is a term used in biology to
describe the coexistence of different species that form relations via indirect coordination. SHARE
exploits a mediator system (e.g., the 802.19.1 system) to establish the indirect coordination
mechanism between coexisting networks.
In SHARE, the heterogeneous coexistence problem is addressed in two ways. First, we
propose an ecology-inspired spectrum allocation algorithm inspired by an interspecific resource
competition model. This algorithm enables a CR network to calculate the amount of spectrum that
it should appropriate without direct negotiation with competing networks. Second, we propose
a foraging-based channel selection algorithm, inspired by the ideal free distribution model in
the optimal foraging theory, that enables each CR network to select the most appropriate TVWS
channels. Note that these algorithms do not require coexisting networks to engage in direct
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negotiation. Our analytical and simulation results show that SHARE guarantees weighted-fairness
in partitioning spectrum and improves spectrum utilization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide background knowledge of the
mediator system, and theoretical ecology in Section II. In Section III, we give an overview of
SHARE. We present the two SHARE algorithms and provide analytical results in Sections IV
and V, respectively. In Section VI, we evaluate the performance of SHARE using the simulation.
We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
As stated previously, SHARE employs a mediator system to establish an indirect coordination
mechanism between CR networks. Due to the conflict-of-interest issues and customer privacy
concerns between competing networks, the mediator is not the global decision maker, and it
only forwards sanitized data to the coexisting networks. Using the forwarded information, each
CR network makes coexistence decisions autonomously using the two algorithms proposed in
this paper.
A. The Mediator System
The IEEE 802.19.1 system is a good candidate to serve as the mediator. The IEEE 802.19.1
system [16] defines a set of logical entities and a set of standardized interfaces for enabling
coordination between heterogeneous CR networks. In Figure 1, we show the architecture of
an 802.19.1 system which includes three entities in the grey box: (1) the coexistence manager
(CM) acts as the local decision maker of the coexistence process; (2) the coexistence database
and information server (CDIS) provides coexistence-related control information to the CMs, and
(3) the coexistence enabler (CE) enables communications between the 802.19.1 system and the
TV band device (TVBD) network. The TVWS database indicates the list of channels used by
incumbent users and their locations, and it is connected to the 802.19.1 system via backhaul
connections.
B. Coexistence-related Constructs in Ecology
In this subsection, we review the models and constructs in theoretical ecology that inspired
the design of SHARE.
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Fig. 1. IEEE 802.19.1 system architecture.
1) Interspecific competition model: In ecology, interspecific competition is a distributed form
of competition in which individuals of different species compete for the same resource in an
ecosystem without direct interactions between them [27]. The impact of interspecific competition
on populations have been formalized in a mathematical model called the Lotka-Volterra (L-V)
competition model [18], [28]. In this model, the impact on population dynamics of species i can
be calculated separately by a differential equation given below:
dNi
dt
= riNi
(
1−
Ni +
∑
j 6=i αijNj
Ki
)
. (1)
In this equation, Ni is the population size of species i, Ki is the carrying capacity (which is the
maximum population of species i if it is the only species present in the environment), ri is the
intrinsic rate of increase, and αij is the competition coefficient which represents the impact of
species j’s population growth on the population dynamics of species i.
2) Ideal free distribution (IFD): In the optimal foraging theory (OFT), animals forage in such
a way as to maximize their net energy intake per unit time, and the ideal free distribution (IFD)
was introduced in [8] as an OFT model. IFD has been used to analyze how animals distribute
themselves across different patches of resources. Suppose there are a number of disjoint patches
of resource (e.g., food) to be allocated to animals in a given environment. These patches are
indexed by i = 0, ..., p − 1. Let xi denote the amount of animals in the i-th patch. The total
population of animals in the environment is ρ =
∑
i∈[0,p−1] xi.
Let ui be the suitability of the i-th patch, which quantifies the patch’s attractiveness to the
animals.
ui =
ai
xi
, (2)
where ai represents the nutrients per second in patch i.
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The fitness of an animal in a patch is typically assumed to be equal to the suitability of the
patch. Let φi be the fitness of an animal in the i-th patch, and thus φi = ui.
The IFD is a sequential allocation process where more (less) animals are distributed in patches
with higher (lower) suitability. The IFD’s equilibrium point is achieved when each animal
simultaneously maximizes its own fitness by moving into the patch with the highest suitability.
At the equilibrium point, the suitability of all patches and the fitness of all animals equalize.
The “input matching rule” is used to characterize the equilibrium point of an IFD process [23],
and is prescribed as follows: animals are distributed such that for all i ∈ [0, p− 1],
xi∑p−1
j=0 xj
=
ai∑p−1
j=0 aj
. (3)
III. OVERVIEW OF SHARE
In this section, we present the system model, underlying assumptions and the architecture of
SHARE.
A. System Model
We assume n heterogeneous CR networks are co-located, and they coexist in the same TVWS
that includes N TVWS channels with identical bandwidth. Let K denote this set of CR networks,
and all of these networks in K are registered with the mediator system. Every CR network is
composed of multiple TVBDs and a CR-enabled base station (BS) (or access point). The TVWS
channels are labeled with indices 0, 1, ..., N − 1.
Number of TVWS channels. In this paper, we focus on the case when the number of channels
N is no less than the number of co-located heterogeneous networks, n. That is, every network is
allowed to exclusively occupy at least one channel. Here, we assume the 6 MHz TVWS channel.
The bandwidth requirement. We define the bandwidth requirement of a CR network as the
number of TVWS channels that it needs to satisfy the QoS requirements of its traffic load. Let
Ri denote the bandwidth requirement of network i.
The mediator-based indirect coordination. SHARE establishes a mediator-based indirect
coordination mechanism between coexisting CR networks. There is no direct coordination be-
tween the coexisting networks, and they have to interact with each other by exchanging control
information through a third-party mediator. Specifically, SHARE utilizes a CDIS (which is one
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TABLE I
A mapping between biological and CR network ecosystems.
Biological ecosystem CR network system
A species A CR network
Population Spectrum share
of a species of a CR network
Population dynamics Dynamics of
(growth or decline) spectrum share
of the components of an 802.19.1 system) as a mediator. Note that CDIS is not a global or
centralized decision maker, but rather it is an information directory server with simple data
processing capabilities.
Exchange of sanitized information. The mediator helps address conflict-of-interest issues and
customer privacy concerns, which may arise when coexisting networks operated by competing
service providers are required to exchange sensitive traffic information in order to carry out
coexistence mechanisms. If needed, the mediator sanitizes the sensitive information received
from the coexisting networks and then returns the sanitized information back to them. The
coexisting networks execute their coordinated coexistence mechanisms using the sanitized data.
B. The Two Tasks of Spectrum Sharing
In a spectrum sharing process, a CR network has to perform two tasks: (1) figure out how much
spectrum it can appropriate given its bandwidth requirement; and (2) select the best segment of
spectrum to utilize. The first task is called spectrum share allocation, and the second task is
called channel selection.
1) Ecology-inspired spectrum share allocation: Suppose a TVWS channel is the minimum
unit amount of spectrum allocation. Let Ai denote the amount of spectrum allocated to network i.
Since N ≥ n, every CR network is assumed to exclusively occupy at least one channel, and
thus Ai ∈ [1, N − n+ 1] for network i ∈ K.
Equivalently, we can rewrite Ai as Ai = 1 + Si, where Si ∈ [0, N − n] is the amount of
spectrum that is dynamically allocated to network i during the spectrum sharing process. We
refer to Si as the spectrum share of network i. Given n competing networks in K,
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• When N = n (the trivial case), every CR network acquires only one channel, and the
dynamically allocated spectrum share is zero.
• When N > n, every CR network may acquire more than one channel, and the sum of the
spectrum share values of all networks is equal to (N − n).
Our objective is that the spectrum share allocation process will eventually reach a state of
equilibrium, where the spectrum share of each network is proportional to its reported bandwidth
requirement.
Spectrum share allocation among the coexisting networks through direct coordination may not
be possible (due to a lack of infrastructure), too costly, or may be shunned by the competing
network operators because they do not want to provide their network traffic information. Instead
of direct coordination, the SHARE framework adopts an indirect coordination mechanism, which
is inspired by an interspecific competition model from theoretical ecology.
In ecology, the population dynamics of a species in the interspecific resource competition
process can be captured by the L-V competition model. In the context of CR network coexistence,
we build a weighted competition model to help a CR network to determine the dynamics of its
spectrum share, given its bandwidth requirement. To complete this task, the mediator exchanges
two types of control information with every CR network: (1) network i reports the current value
of Si to the mediator; and (2) the mediator replies back to network i with the sanitized data,
i.e., sum of spectrum share values of all other coexisting networks, i.e.,
∑
j 6=i Sj .
2) Foraging-based channel selection: To maximally fulfill its allocated spectrum share, each
CR network is allowed to select up to ⌊Si⌋ channels. Let Ci denote the set of channels selected
by network i, where |Ci| ≤ ⌊Si⌋. Without explicitly knowing others’ selection, it is possible that
multiple CR networks select the same channel, thereby causing inter-network interference.
In the optimal foraging theory, an animal is free to move to the patch of resource that has
the maximum suitability such that the animal’s fitness can be maximized. Similarly, SHARE
guides a CR network to always select the channel that has the maximum attractiveness (i.e., the
minimum interference).
In the channel selection process, two types of control information are exchanged: (1) CR
network i sends Ci to the mediator; and (2) the mediator calculates the suitability of every
channel, and sends the values back to network i. Network i uses this information in its channel
selection. The definition of suitability will be given in Section V.
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IV. AN ECOLOGY-INSPIRED SPECTRUM SHARE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
A. Weighted-fair Spectrum Share Allocation Problem
Suppose a set K of n co-located CR networks have individual bandwidth requirementsR1, R2, ..., Rn,
and operate over the same TVWS. The first objective for coexisting CR networks is to split the
TVWS into n pieces of spectrum shares that are proportional to their individual bandwidth
requirements, without sharing individual’s bandwidth requirement with each other.
If network j achieves a spectrum share of (N −n)Rj/
∑
iRi, we say that this spectrum share
allocation process is weighted-fair.
Let S(K) = [S1, S2, . . . , Sn] denote the spectrum share vector for K over the TVWS
1. We
define the fairness index, F (S(K)), for networks in K as follows:
F (S(K)) =
(∑
i∈K Si
)2
∑
i∈KRi ·
∑
i∈KRi
(
Si
Ri
)2 . (4)
The maximum value of F (S(K)) is one (the best or weighted-fair case), where the allocated
spectrum share value of a network is proportional to its bandwidth requirement.
Let Ii denote the set of shared control information known by network i, and it is easy to see
that Ri ∈ Ii. However, Rj /∈ Ii because competing networks i and j have conflict of interest
issues and customer privacy concerns.
Then, we formulate a weighted-fair spectrum sharing allocation problem where heterogeneous
CR networks dynamically determine their spectrum share values.
Problem 1. Given a set of n co-located CR networks, K, operating over N TVWS channels,
one has to solve the following problem to find the spectrum share vector for K:
Maximize F (S(K))
subject to
Si
Sj
=
Ri
Rj
, Rj /∈ Ii, ∀i, j ∈ K.
The first constraint Si
Sj
= Ri
Rj
guarantees the weighted fairness, and the second constraint implies
that a network i has no idea about any other network j’s bandwidth requirement.
1The vector is a row vector or a 1× n matrix.
9
B. A Weighted-fair Spectrum Competition Model
1) The stable equilibrium of the L-V competition model: The L-V competition model provides
a method for defining a state of “stable equilibrium” and finding the sufficient conditions for
achieving it. Consider the interspecific competition process described by equation (1), when
Ki = Kj and αij = αji for any two species i and j, the sufficient condition for stable equilibrium
is αij < 1.
2) The basic spectrum competition model: In Table I, we identify a number of analogies
between a biological ecosystem and a CR network system. Based on equation (1) and the
analogies, we can easily obtain a basic spectrum competition model as follows.
dSi
dt
= rSi
(
1−
Si + α
∑
j 6=i Sj
N − n
)
, (5)
where Si is the spectrum share for network i, and r is an intrinsic rate of increase. In equation (5),
the carrying capacity is equal to the sum of spectrum share values of all CR networks, i.e., N−n.
A competition coefficient α < 1 will guarantee the stable equilibrium—i.e., all the competing
networks will have the same spectrum share value.
Next, we will show how to extend the basic competition model to be a weighted-fair spectrum
competition model that complies with the weighted-fairness requirement (i.e., Si
Sj
= Ri
Rj
for any
two networks i and j) at the stable equilibrium of CR network coexistence.
3) The weighted-fair spectrum competition model: The basic spectrum competition model
guarantees a stable equilibrium where all the competing networks have the same spectrum share
value. However, solutions to Problem 1 must satisfy the requirement of weighted fairness, which
implies that the competing networks’ spectrum share values are proportional to their bandwidth
requirements. For example, if network i has a bandwidth requirement that is twice of that of
network j, then network i’s allocated spectrum share should be twice of the allocated spectrum
share of network j.
To support the weighted-fairness in spectrum share allocation, we construct a weighted-fair
spectrum competition model by introducing the concept of “sub-species”. We model a CR
network as a number of sub-species, and the network with a higher bandwidth requirement would
have a greater number of sub-species than a network with a lower bandwidth requirement.
We use the bandwidth requirement Ri as the number of sub-species of network i. Let Si,k
denote the spectrum share allocated to the sub-species k of network i, where k ∈ [1, Ri]. In
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the weighted competition model, every sub-species k of network i calculates the change in its
spectrum share according to the following equation.
δi,k =
dSi,k
dt
= rSi,k
(
1−
Si,k + α
∑
κ 6=k Si,κ + α
∑
j 6=i Sj
N − n
)
.
(6)
Then, network i obtains its spectrum share value by combining the spectrum share values of all
its sub-species, i.e., Si =
∑
k Si,k.
In SHARE, every network i periodically sends its spectrum share value Si to the mediator,
and then the mediator sends back the sanitized data βi =
∑
j 6=i Sj to network i. The spectrum
share allocation process terminates when δi,k = 0 for all i and k. Note that the sanitized data
βi is useful to address the conflict of interests and privacy issues between competing networks.
That is, even though βi is known to network i, it is unable to figure out any other network j’s
bandwidth requirement, i.e., Rj /∈ Ii, ∀j 6= i. The use of sanitized data coincides with the second
constraint of Problem 1.
The pseudo-code in Algorithm 1 illustrates the spectrum share allocation process, and the
detailed steps are described below.
1) A CR network i (which is viewed as a species) starts its spectrum share allocation process
by creating a number of Ri sub-species.
2) At the beginning of every iteration, every sub-species calculates the change rate of its
spectrum share (i.e.,
dSi,k
dt
) using the sanitized data βi obtained from the mediator.
3) If the change rate of spectrum share is positive (or negative), a sub-species increases (or
decreases) its spectrum share.
4) At the end of every iteration, send the new spectrum share value to the mediator, and
update the value of βi from it.
5) Last three steps are repeated until there is no sub-species with a non-zero change rate of
spectrum share; that is
dSi,k
dt
= 0 for every sub-species k of any network i.
6) The allocated spectrum share for network i is
∑
k Si,k.
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Algorithm 1 The Spectrum Share Allocation Algorithm.
Input: the competition coefficient α, capacity N − n, intrinsic rate of increase r, the sanitized
data βi.
Output: the spectrum share, Si, for network i.
1: Network i generates a number of Ri sub-species.
2: Update the value of βi from the mediator.
3: while (∃k ∈ [1, Ri], s.t. δi,k 6= 0) do
4: for k = 1 to Ri do
5: if δk 6= 0 then
6: Si,k = Si,k + δi,k.
7: end if
8: end for
9: Send Si =
∑
k Si,k to the mediator, and update the value of βi.
10: end while
11: Si =
∑
k Si,k.
C. Weighted-fairness and Stability
In this section, we show the properties of the equilibrium status achieved by Algorithm 1. We
first prove that the spectrum share allocation algorithm satisfies the requirement of weighted-
fairness defined in Problem 1.
Lemma 1. Given n coexisting CR networks in K, when α < 1, the spectrum share allocation
process of Algorithm 1 is weighted-fair in partitioning the TVWS consisting of (N−n) channels.
Proof. Suppose network i ∈ K has a number of Ri sub-species. The spectrum share allocation
problem is equivalent to a problem where all sub-species compete for the resource using the L-V
competition model. Since the sufficient condition for the the equilibrium in the L-V competition
model, α < 1, is satisfied, the algorithm will terminates after a finite number of iterations, and
all sub-species obtain the same spectrum share at the equilibrium point [11], [12], which is equal
to N−n∑
j∈KRj
. Hence, network i with Ri sub-species will obtain a spectrum share Ri
N−n∑
j∈K Rj
, and
thus Si
Si′
= Ri
Ri′
, ∀i, i′ ∈ K.
Then we prove that the equilibrium point achieved by the weighted-fair competition model is
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stable.
Theorem 1. Let l =
∑
i∈KRi represent the total number of sub-species in the system. The
differential equations (6) describe an l-dimensional system where the equilibrium when Si =
Ri
N−n
l
is stable.
Proof. Suppose CR networks in K generate a total number of l sub-species. For the sake of
simplicity, we assign every sub-species an index from {1, ..., l}. Let S∗ = [s∗1, ..., s
∗
l ] be the
spectrum share vector at the equilibrium point for all sub-species in the system, where s∗i is
the allocated spectrum share of sub-species i at the equilibrium point. By Lemma 1, we have
s∗i =
N−n
l
, where i ∈ [1, l], and equation (6) is equivalent to
ds∗i
dt
= rs∗i
(
1−
s∗i + α
∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,l] s
∗
j
N − n
)
= 0. (7)
That is, s∗i + α
∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,l] s
∗
j = N − n.
We will prove the equilibrium S∗ is stable by linearizing the system equations at this equilib-
rium point. Let S = [s1, ..., sl] be a spectrum share vector for all sub-species at a non-equilibrium
point. We denote the differential equation at this point as
Gi(S) = rsi
(
1−
si + α
∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,l] sj
N − n
)
. (8)
Let ∆si = si − s
∗
i . By linearizing equation (8) at the equilibrium point, we obtain
Gi(S) = Gi(s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
l ) +
∑
i∈[1,l]
(
∂Gi(S)
∂si
∣∣∣∣
s∗
1
,...,s∗
l
·∆si
)
= −
(r
l
)
∆si −
rα
l
∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,l]
∆sj . (9)
We derive the l by l Jacobian matrix for the above equation (9) as follows
A =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− r
l
− rα
l
− rα
l
. . . − rα
l
− rα
l
− r
l
− rα
l
. . . − rα
l
...
. . .
. . . . . .
...
− rα
l
− rα
l
. . . − rα
l
− r
l
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
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which is a symmetric matrix. This matrix has two eigenvalues λ = − r
l
− (l−1)rα
l
and
r(α−1)
l
.
Since 0 < α < 1, the two eigenvalues are negative. Based on the stability theory, the system is
stable if all eigenvalues are negative. Hence, the differential equations shown by (6) describe an
l-dimensional system and the equilibrium S∗ = {s∗i |s
∗
i =
N−n
l
, ∀i ∈ [1, l]} is stable.
Convergence time. Next, we analyze the time required for the proposed algorithm to converge
to the stable equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Consider N networks that compete for the same spectrum band, then the time-to-
convergence to the SHARE’s equilibrium is Tc = O(ln(C/l)).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, there are a total number of l sub-species. Let A =∑
j 6=i,j∈[1,l] sj = (l − 1)s0, and equation (7) can be rewritten as
dsi
dt
= rsi
(
1−
si + αA
C
)
= 0. (10)
By integrating (10), we can obtain
si(t) =
s0e
rt(1−αAC )(C − αA)
s0(e
rt(1−αAC ) − 1) + (C − αA)
. (11)
To calculate the time-to-convergence, we consider the time which is required to increase the
spectrum share for network i from s0 to si(t) = s
∗ = C/l. By solving (11), the time Tc becomes:
Tc =
C
r(C − αA)
ln
(
si(t)(C − αA− s0)
s0(C − αA− si(t))
)
.
The time of convergence of SHARE is O(ln(C/l)), and it is exponentially fast.
V. A FORAGING-BASED CHANNEL SELECTION ALGORITHM
A. The Channel Selection Problem
Given the allocated spectrum share, network i is allowed to select up to Mi = ⌊Si⌋ + 1
channels. We call Mi as the number of allocated channels of network i, i.e., |Ci| ≤Mi. Without
direct coordination (e.g., sharing of control information such as Ci and Cj), it is possible that
two networks i and j select the same channel, and the resulting inter-network interference will
degrade the network performance.
To minimize the interference with other networks, every CR network in K tries to select
channels with the highest quality (or the least interference) so as to maximally utilize its allocated
spectrum share. This process is similar to the behaviors of animal in the IFD model: an animal
14
TABLE II
A mapping between the animal’s foraging behavior and the CR network’s channel selection process.
Foraging Channel selection
A patch of resource A TVWS channel
An animal A network agent
Suitability of a patch Selectivity of a channel
selects a patch of resources that has the highest suitability such that its own fitness can be
maximized [20], which leads to an evolutionary stable equilibrium. We have created analogies
between the foraging behavior and the channel selection process2, as given in Table II.
Based on the mapping between channel selection and IFD processes, we consider the N
channels as N disjoint patches of resource in an environment that are indexed by i = 0, ..., N−1.
Since every network i is allowed to select up to Mi channels, a CR network will create a number
of Mi network agents to complete the channel selection task.
Let yi denote the amount of agents that selects channel i. The total population of agents is
P =
∑
i∈[0,N−1] yi =
∑
i∈KMi. These agents are indexed by the mediator as 0, 1, ..., P − 1.
Similar to the definition of a patch’s suitability (equation (2)), we define the selectivity of a
channel h (i.e., channel h’s quality) as
eh =
1
yh
, (12)
where yh is the number of agents that has selected channel h. We equate the agent fitness of an
agent that selects channel h, fh, to the selectivity of channel h. That is, fh = eh.
Then, we define the system fitness as
Φ = min{f0, f1, ..., fP−1}.
The maximum possible value for Φ is one. When Φ = 1, every network agent exclusively
occupies one channel, and every channel is selected by at most one network agent. In other
words, network i occupies a number of Mi allocated channels, and its allocated spectrum share
is maximally fulfilled. Then, we formulate the channel selection problem as follows.
2Detailed analyses can be found in [30]
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Problem 2. Given a system of n coexisting CR networks, K, one has to solve the following
problem to maximize the system fitness.
Maximize Φ
subject to Cj /∈ Ii, ∀i, j ∈ K.
The constraint Cj /∈ Ii implies that in the channel selection process, there is no sharing of
control information, Ci and Cj , between any two networks i and j.
B. The Channel Selection Strategy and Algorithm
Similar to the animal’s foraging behavior in an IFD process, a network agent under SHARE
selects a channel that has the highest selectivity value, and the system tend to reach an equilibrium
point where the minimum agent fitness is maximized.
At the beginning of the channel selection process, every network i knows the number of its
allocated channels Mi, and the set of its occupied channels Ci = ∅. A network starts a channel
selection process by sending a request on behalf of one of its agent, and this process terminates
until all of its agents have finished the channel selection task. The main procedures of the channel
selection process are stated below, and the pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 2.
1) The mediator processes all received requests sequentially: for a received request from
network i, it calculates the channel selectivity values of all channels, and send these values
in a response to network i.
2) The agent of network i follows a greedy algorithm to select a channel h from [0, ..., N−1],
which has the highest selectivity value, i.e.,
h = arg max
h∈[0,N−1]
eh.
3) Network i sends the channel selection decision to the mediator, and channel h is added to
Ci
4) The mediator recalculate the selectivity value of channel h based on the received channel
selection decision and equation (12), and then continue to process the next request.
C. Evolutionary Stable Strategy
In this section, we use the evolutionary game theory to prove that the above channel selection
strategy is indeed an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). In a game-theoretic perspective, each
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Algorithm 2 The Foraging-based Channel Selection Algorithm.
Input: Mi, and K
Output: Ci.
1: Update Ci = ∅.
2: while |Ci| < Mi do
3: Obtain the selectivity values of all channels, eh, ∀h ∈ [0, N − 1], from the mediator.
4: Select channel h = argmaxh∈[0,N−1] eh.
5: Ci = Ci ∪ {h}.
6: Send the channel selection decision h to the mediator that will recalculate eh =
1
yh+1
.
7: end while
network agent under SHARE’s channel selection strategy is viewed as an individual animal that
makes choices among N patches (i.e., N channels) to maximize its fitness according to an IFD
process.
Let Pµ denote a population of animals that take strategy µ, and let f(µ, Pν) be the fitness of
an animal that takes strategy µ in a population of animals that take strategy ν. A strategy µ is
an ESS if both of the following two conditions hold [19].
1) For all ν 6= µ, f(ν, Pµ) ≤ f(µ, Pµ).
2) For all ν 6= µ, if f(ν, Pµ) = f(µ, Pµ), then f(ν, Pω) < f(µ, Pω), where Pω is a population
formed from both strategies µ and ν, and ω = qν + (1− q)µ for a small q > 0.
By the following theorem, we establish the relationship between the ESS and the proposed
channel selection strategy.
Theorem 3. The channel selection strategy of SHARE is an evolutionary stable strategy.
Proof. First, we consider the channel selection process where network agents make choices
among N channels as an IFD process where animals distribute themselves across N patches of
resource.
Let µ represent the channel selection strategy of SHARE where an agent always chooses the
channel with the highest selectivity to maximize its agent fitness.
Since
∑
i(Si + 1) = N , the total population of agents, P =
∑
iMi ≤ N . Let Pµ represent
the population with all agents playing strategy µ such that the IFD is achieved.
17
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Fig. 2. Convergence to the equilibrium.
Under strategy µ, yh = 1 or 0, and thus the selectivity of a channel eh = 1 or ∞ respectively,
∀h ∈ [0, N − 1]. As a result, the strategy is equivalent to a strategy µ′ where an agent always
chooses a channel h with yh = 0. Hence,
f(µ′, Pµ′) = fh = 1,
for an agent that selects channel h in a population of agents using strategy µ′.
Suppose that the agent makes a unilateral deviation to strategy ν 6= µ′ that corresponds to
choosing channel g 6= h, where g ∈ [0, N − 1]. Since ν 6= µ′, yg 6= yh = 0, and then yg ≥ 1.
Then f(ν, Pµ′) ≤
1
2
< f(µ′, Pµ′) = f(µ, Pµ).
Since f(ν, Pµ) < f(µ, Pµ), the channel selection strategy of SHARE is an ESS.
The resulting point of the proposed channel selection strategy y∗ = [y∗0, ..., y
∗
N−1], such that
yh = 0 or 1 for all h = 0, ..., N − 1, is a unique global maximum point that solves Problem 2.
This represents that each network agent simultaneously chooses a channel with the highest
selectivity (i.e., the least interference) to maximize its own fitness. Any number of simultaneous
disturbances from this point will lead to a possible degradation in fitness of agents.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SHARE in two steps. We first investigate the
the stability of the equilibrium achieved by the weighted-fair spectrum share allocation scheme.
Then, we compare the foraging-based channel selection scheme and the random channel selection
strategy in terms of system fitness.
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A. The Equilibrium in Spectrum Share Allocation
In the first set of simulations, we simulate two CR networks under SHARE that coexist over
20 channels. We fix the bandwidth requirements of two networks as R1 = 2 and R2 = 3,
which implies that network 1 has two sub-species and network 2 has three in the spectrum share
allocation process using the weighted-fair competition model. In a resource competition process
based on the L-V competition model, the chosen parameter values, i.e., the competition coefficient
α < 1 and the intrinsic rate of increase r < 2 [22], also apply to the proposed model in this paper.
The discussions on how to choose appropriate parameters values to achieve the fast convergence
to the equilibrium can be found in [11], [22], and in this set of simulations we use α = 0.9 and
r = 1.95. Next, we show how the coexisting networks under SHARE achieve the equilibrium
where the spectrum share of each network is proportional to its bandwidth requirement.
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Convergence to the equilibrium. From Figure 2, we observe the dynamics of the spectrum
share value of each network and each sub-species within a network. “Sub-species (i, j)” in
the figure legend represents the sub-species j within network i. The system converges to the
equilibrium state in finite time where all sub-species of every network are allocated the same
spectrum share value. The aggregate spectrum share value for all sub-species in a network is
proportional to the network’s given bandwidth requirement.
Stability of the equilibrium. To test the stability of the equilibrium point, we introduce two
types of disturbance in bandwidth requirement by (1) silencing the sub-species (2, 3) for a short
time period, and (2) deleting the sub-species (2, 3). Figure 3 shows the dynamics of spectrum
share values when the disturbance is introduced: even the system is driven away by the change
of bandwidth requirement from its current equilibrium status, it quickly converges to a new
equilibrium point where the allocated spectrum share values are proportional to the new value
of bandwidth requirements.
The weighted fairness. In this simulation, we vary the number of coexisting CR network, and
in each simulation run, the bandwidth requirement, Ri, for each network i is randomly chosen
from the range [1, 5]. Then, we compare SHARE with a “fair” allocation scheme that splits the
spectrum “equally” to n pieces of spectrum share and allocates them to n coexisting networks.
Hence, in the fair allocation scheme, all networks get the same spectrum share value regardless
of their bandwidth requirements. We measure the weighted fairness values using the fairness
index defined in (4). Figure 4 clearly shows that SHARE allocates spectrum in a weighted-fair
manner, and it has an advantage of guaranteeing the high weighted-fairness (close to one).
B. The Channels Selection Strategy
In this section, we assume the weighted-fair spectrum share allocation scheme, and compare
four channel selection strategies: SHARE strategy, “random” strategy, and two hybrid strategies.
A random strategy prescribes that every network selects a channel h randomly from the set of
unoccupied channels ({0, 1, ..., N−1}\C). The first (or second) hybrid strategy is called “hybrid1”
(or “hybrid2”), in which only one network (or half of networks) takes the random strategy, while
the others follow the SHARE strategy. Besides the system fitness, we use a measure called
collision probability to define the probability that the collision of channel selection decisions
between two networks occurs (i.e., two networks simultaneously select the same channel).
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Fig. 5. System fitness and collision probability, given various number of coexisting networks.
Number of coexisting networks. First, we fix the number of allocated channels for every
network i as Mi = 1, and vary the number of coexisting networks. From simulation results in
Figure 5, we observe that the system fitness of SHARE is close to one, and other strategies lead
to a system fitness much lower than one. Similarly, the SHARE strategy avoids the collision
of channel selection decisions of different networks, while other strategies fail to address this
problem. For results of either the random or hybrid strategies, we also observe that the system
fitness drops (or the collision probability increases) as the number of existing networks increases.
Random bandwidth requirement values. We simulate five coexisting networks, and let the
bandwidth requirement (BR) for a network i be a random variable that is uniformly distributed
in the range of [m− σ,m+ σ], where m = 4 and σ = 0, 1, 2, 3. We call m as the mean of BR,
and σ as the half range of BR’s change. In the trivial case when σ = 0, all networks have the
same BR value.
According to the weighted-fair spectrum share allocation scheme, the increased value of σ will
introduce the discrepancy in the number of allocated channels to different coexisting networks.
Note that two network agents that belong to the same network will not select the same channel.
For a network that takes a random strategy, the increased number of agents will reduce the
number of instances of collisions between channel selection decisions. Thus, the increase of σ
will help lower the collision probability, and thus improving the system fitness for random and
hybrid strategies (see results of Figure 6).
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Fig. 6. System fitness and collision probability, given random bandwidth requirements.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Inspired by the symbiotic coexistence in ecology, in this paper we presented a framework called
Symbiotic Heterogeneous coexistence ARchitecturE (SHARE), which enables collaborative co-
existence among heterogeneous CR networks over TVWS. SHARE enables two heterogeneous
CR networks to coexist in TVWS through a mediator-based indirect coordination mechanism
between them, which avoids the drawbacks of the direct coordination mechanism. Based on the
interspecific competition model and the ideal free distribution model in theoretical ecology, we
proposed two SHARE algorithms for every coexisting CR network to autonomously complete
the two spectrum sharing tasks: (1) dynamically determine its spectrum share that is proportional
to its bandwidth requirement, and (2) select channels to improve the system fitness. Analytical
and simulation results show that SHARE guarantees a stable equilibrium of coexisting networks
in which the weighted-fairness is ensured and the system fitness is maximized.
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